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ABSTRACT
Financial asset markets are sociotechnical systems whose con-
stituent agents are subject to evolutionary pressure as unprotable
agents exit the marketplace and more protable agents continue
to trade assets. Using a population of evolving zero-intelligence
agents and a frequent batch auction price-discovery mechanism
as substrate, we analyze the role played by evolutionary selec-
tion mechanisms in determining macro-observable market statis-
tics. Specically, we show that selection mechanisms incorporat-
ing a local tness-proportionate component are associated with
high correlation between a micro, risk-aversion parameter and a
commonly-used macro-volatility statistic, while a purely quantile-
based selection mechanism shows signicantly less correlation and
is associated with higher absolute levels of tness (prot) than other
selection mechanisms. ese results point the way to a possible re-
structuring of market incentives toward reduction in market-wide
worst performance, leading prot-driven agents to behave in ways
that are associated with benecial macro-level outcomes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e concept of adaptive nancial markets has been studied exten-
sively in quantitative nance for nearly twenty years. e ecient
markets hypothesis (EMH), which in its weakest form states that
the price of an asset should, under conditions including costless
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information and agents with rational expectations about the fu-
ture, reect all publicly-available past information, has been an
inuential starting point for the study of nancial theory since its
initial publication in the late 1960s [22]. However, there is empirical
evidence that this hypothesis does not hold. A well-documented
momentum eect exists for asset prices: assets that have done well
(poorly) in past time periods will tend to do well (poorly) in future
time periods, for periods ranging up to a year in the future [14]. In
addition, there have been objections to the rational expectations
assumption of EMH on a theoretical basis [16, 20, 21]. Critics of
the EMH have proposed a so-called “adaptive-markets hypothesis”
(AMH), in the framework of which the population of agents is in
constant ux, adapting to changing market forces and subject to
evolutionary pressure [9]. e rise of high-frequency trading (HFT)
in response to a shi in the regulatory environment in U.S. asset
markets in the mid-2000s is one factor that has lent credence to the
AMH theory [15, 25, 29].
As a result of the apparent adaptive nature of modern nancial
markets, there has been substantial application of agent-based
model (ABM) methods to model various market features of in-
terest [13, 19, 28]. Such models oen assume constant a particular
selection mechanism by which agents of low tness (usually, low
protability) are selected out of the market and agents of higher
tness remain [12, 18, 33]. However, the design of the selection
mechanism may have a material eect on measurable quantities
in the marketplace, such as price or return time series, preferences
(parameters) of high-tness agents, and volatility.
In this work, we analyze the role of various selection mechanisms
in determining the preferences of a population of evolving zero-
intelligence agents interacting through the means of an auction
mechanism. Comparing two fundamentally distinct mechanisms—
one a global mechanism based on population prot quantiles and
the other a local mechanism based on sample protability—we show
that this choice not only aects the dynamic behavior and distri-
bution of agent parameters as shown in Figures 2 and 3, but also
has a signicant eect on micro-macro volatility correlations. We
nd that incorporating local tness-proportionate selection greatly
increases the correlation between a micro-level, risk aversion pa-
rameter and macro-level volatility as measured by standard nan-
cial econometric machinery, compared to purely quantile-based
selection.
2 THEORY AND SIMULATION
We focus our aention on the mechanism by which agents of low
tness—unprotable agents— are selected out of the market. In
real-world nancial markets, agents whose trading strategies pro-
duce low returns on capital can experience an outow of funds to
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Figure 1: A cartoon of the nancial system considered here is shown. Agents interact via the mechanism of a frequent batch
auction, explained in Section 2.2, and are subject to a type of probabilistic selection mechanism that discards agents with low
tness, which is here dened by prot, and replaces discarded agents with new agents whose parameters are drawn from the
distribution of parameters among remaining agents. Statistics from market activity and the selection process are gathered
during iterations of the simulation and subsequently analyzed.
agents whose strategies produce beer returns as investors seek
the highest possible return subject to their risk preferences. In
a world of perfect information, rms would thus be selected out
of a market according to a type of tness-proportionate selection.
Real nancial markets—and markets of all kinds—are rife with in-
formation asymmetries [1, 17]; here, we focus on the situation of
perfect information to highlight the importance of the selection
mechanism on macro-level observables.
2.1 Agent specication
Agent i’s tness function at time t is given by its prot at that time,
dened as
pii (t) = ci (t) + si (t)X (t), (1)
where ci and si are the amount of cash held by agent i (units of
currency), and number of shares of the asset held by agent i , re-
spectively, and X is the price of the asset. Agents are permied to
“sell short”: they are not restricted to have a non-negative amount
of cash. Agents are zero-intelligence [10, 11] in the sense that their
actions are purely random given a set of parameters; agents do
not adapt in our model but are subject to evolutionary pressure
across generations. e behavior of an agent is determined by three
parameters: pbid,i , the probability of submiing a bid order in a
time period given that the agent trades in that time period; Nshares,i ,
the mean number of shares submied by the agent in a time pe-
riod; and νi , the so-called “volatility preference” of the agent, the
role of which we will describe presently. Given the asset price at
time t , X (t), the agent submits a bid order with probability pbid,i
(equivalently, an ask order with probability 1 − pbid,i ) with num-
ber of shares distributed as Ni (t) ∼ Poisson(Nshares,i ) and price
distributed according to the random variable
X
(order)
i (t + 1) = X (t) + νiui (t), (2)
where ui (t) ∼ U[−1, 1]. e volatility preference parameter thus
encodes a measure of regard for the current price level X (t): low νi
implies a preference for the current price level, while larger values
lead to larger moves in both positive and negative directions. is
parameter is interpreted as a measure of risk aversion (small ν ) or
risk neutrality / risk seeking (large ν ).
2.2 Price-discovery mechanism
Market price is determined by a frequent batch auction (FBA),
introduced by Budish et al. as a response to HFT strategies [4, 5],
which we now describe briey. Modern nancial markets primarily
use a continuous double auction (CDA) mechanism to match buyers
and sellers, though FBA has recently aracted much theoretical
and intellectual property interest [8, 31], and batch auctions more
generally have been in use since at least 2001 on the Paris Bourse
[26]. CDA and FBA share several aributes. Both mechanisms
are double-sided mechanisms in which any number of buyers and
sellers may participate, and participants may enter or leave the
market at any time under both mechanisms. Both mechanisms
also maintain an order book, which accumulates orders that have
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Figure 2: Means and standard deviation of parameter time series dier by selectionmechanism. e le panel displays param-
eter time series averaged over agents; a single time series is plotted for each run of the simulation. e right panel displays
parameter time series averaged over both agents and runs of the simulation. Overall, the quantile selection mechanism leads
to lower spatial standard deviations across runs of the simulation, as can be observed in the le panel. While both the quantile
andmixed selectionmechanisms show decaying averageNshares and ν , tness-proportionate selection shows no such behavior.
e tness-proportionate selection mechanism shows larger variation across runs of the simulation in these variables as well,
with much larger extreme values of ν than either of the other mechanisms. When averaged over both agents and runs of the
simulation, pbid shows eectively no variation in time.
not yet been executed. In practice, both mechanisms feature a
similar price-time execution priority for resting orders, though the
implementation may vary slightly. In other words, orders that have
a beer price, bids with higher prices or asks with lower prices, are
executed rst. Ties in price are broken by the age of the order, with
older orders executing rst.
CDAs allow agents to submit orders at any time, and these orders
are immediately matched against resting orders if possible. Orders
that are not immediately executed will be added to the order book,
where they will wait for a counter-party to accept their conditions.
is procedure results in trading that occurs continuously, aligning
with the name of the mechanism. On the other hand, FBAs divide
trading into discrete intervals. Within each interval agents may
submit orders at any time, which are then placed in the order book.
At the end of a trading interval, a single uniform execution price
is selected by locating the intersection of the supply and demand
curves (i.e. price and quantity of orders from both sides of the
market are used to identify the execution price). Orders to buy
with a limit price at least as high as the selected execution price
and orders to sell with a limit price at least as low as the selected
execution price are then eligible to execute. Eligible orders are
then matched together following price-time priority, i.e. bids with
higher prices and asks with lower prices are matched rst, with ties
broken by order age, and further ties broken by uniform random
selection. e orders that did not execute at time t remain in the
book and are reconsidered for execution in future time periods until
such time as the matching engine considers them to be “stale”, or
too old for consideration. e implementation of FBA considered
here sets the maximum allowed time for an order to remain in the
book to be 24 time periods, or one day.
Since the aim of this work is to understand the eects of selection
pressure and dierent selection mechanisms on macro-statistics
of market activity, we aempt to abstract away other details of
real-world asset markets. ough the U.S. National Market Sys-
tem (NMS) is a fragmented market with no fewer than thirteen
exchanges operating at time of writing [27], we consider only a
single exchange and matching engine here. As noted above, agents
are eectively zero-intelligence; though they are subject to selec-
tive pressure and thus the population of agents may become more
protable over time as weak agents are selected out, individual
agents do not adapt to changing market circumstances.
2.3 Selection mechanisms
Selection occurs with constant probability of pselection = 124 each
time period, so that there is a selection event in one out of every
24 time periods (hours) on average. We consider three selection
mechanisms: a quantile-based mechanism (truncation selection), de-
noted byMquantile; a type of tness-proportionate selection,Mfps,
and a mixture of the two mechanisms,Mmixed, each of which is a
well-known selection method [2]. e quantile-based mechanism
removes agents i whose prot satises pii (t) < F←pi (t )(q), where q
is a quantile (number between 0 and 1) and F←pi (t ) is the quantile
function of the prot distribution across all agents active at time t .
We set q = 0.1 to remove the boom 10% of agents each time the
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Figure 3: Whenuncoupled from time, distributions of parameters are similar across selectionmechanisms. ese distributions
are calculated by computing the empirical pdfs over the union of time series of parameters over all points in time and runs of
the simulation. emixed selection mechanism displays the heaviest tails in the distributions of pbid and Nshares, followed by
the tness-proportionate mechanism. From top to bottom: the quantile-based, mixed, and tness-proportionate mechanisms.
e blue dashed curves and titles indicate optimal ts to the empirical distributions as computed using maximum likelihood
estimation. e distributions of pbid and Nshares are well-t by a t-distribution, while the distribution of ν is well-t by a
log-normal distribution.
quantile-based mechanism is activated. e tness-proportional
selection mechanism is a standard implementation of such a pro-
cedure: a random sample S(t) of agents is selected from the pop-
ulation and each is kept in the population with probability given
by pi (t) = pii (t )∑
j∈S(t ) pij (t ) . We set |S(t)| = 10 in this implementation.
e mixed selection mechanism interpolates between Mquantile
andMfps. When a selection event occurs, with probability 12 the
mechanismMquantile is used and with probability 12 ,Mfps is used.
When agents are selected out of the population, new agents are
added to replace the ones that have exited so that the number of
agents in the population is conserved. We set the number of agents
Nagents = 100 in each run of the simulation. When new agents
enter the model aer a selection event, with probability pinnovation
they draw their governing parameters (pbid, Nshares, and ν ) from
stationary probability distributions that do not change with selec-
tive pressure, and with probability 1 − pinnovation they draw their
governing parameters from the distributions of these parameters
among the members of the population of agents that did not get
selected out of the market. In this work, we set pinnovation = 0.01.
We choose these selection mechanisms not because they are in
some way optimal methods for selecting individuals in an evolving
system—in fact, the disadvantages of tness-proportionate selec-
tion are well-documented [32]—but for their interpretation in the
context of a nancial market. e quantile-based method models
an environment in which an investing public (individuals, rms,
etc.) actively avoid rms that are performing badly in the market,
but do not actively seek out rms whose prots are the highest.
In contrast, a tness-proportionate scheme models a scenario in
which investors seek out the rms that have the highest total prots
and allocate their funds to these rms in proportion to their past
performance. We also included a control simulation model in which
no selection was present and all agents initially in the simulation
at time t = 0 remained in the simulation for the entire time.
2.4 eoretical models
We turn briey to a theoretical model of the evolution of agents’
parameters: pbid, Nshares, and ν . For the sake of convenience we
pass to a continuous time description, though the discrete time of
the simulation is recovered by simply seing dt = 124 days. We
assume that prices evolve according to a zero-mean Le´vy ight,
dX (t) = σXdL(α )X (t), X (0) = X0, (3)
with tail exponent α ∈ (1.7, 2) as suggested by Mandelbrot [23].
is model has been shown to give superior t to real data when
compared with the geometric Brownian motion model of asset
prices [7, 24]. Since any agent whose bid probability deviates too
far from the natural equilibrium of p∗bid =
1
2 will soon become
rapidly unprotable and hence be selected out of the market, we
assume pbid evolves according to a type of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
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Figure 4: e mean power spectral density (PSD) exponent
of population price time series, 〈γ 〉Nsim = 1Nsim
∑Nsim
n=1 γn ,
where γn is dened by Sxx (ω) ∼ ω−γn . All PSD exponents
converge to a value near 〈γ 〉Nsim ∼ 1.8, though the quantile
mechanism has the largest exponent and hence the average
price time series associated with the quantile mechanism is
less autocorrelated than the others.
process,
dpbid(t) = θpbid (p∗bid − pbid(t)) dt + σpbiddL
(α )
pbid (t). (4)
In contrast, there is no logical steady state for Nshares, so we assume
that its evolution is governed by a standard random walk with
heavy-tailed increments arising from the auction mechanism,
dNshares(t) = µNshares dt + σNshares dL(α )Nshares (t). (5)
e parameter µNshares is interpreted as evolutionary dri. e
interpretation of volatility preferenceν as a measure of risk aversion
(small ν ) or risk neutrality / seeking (large ν ) gives insight into a
possible model for its evolution. Simply put, volatility preference
increments in proportion to the current level of volatility preference:
if the population is risk averse, the variation in volatility preference
should be low; if the population is risk neutral or risk-seeking, the
variation in volatility preference will likely be high. Incorporating
an evolutionary dri term, a reasonable model for this phenomenon
is
dν (t) = ν (t)[µνdt + σνdL(α )ν (t)]. (6)
For example, orders submied according to Eq. 2 with ν much
larger than the population average are unlikely to be executed if
the resultant price is favorable to the submiing agent (i.e., very
high ask price or very low bid price relative to the last equilibrium
price) and will result in a large nancial loss to the agent if the
resultant price is likely to be executed (i.e., very high bid price or
very low ask price).
2.5 Methodology
We seek an understanding of the eects of the selection mechanism
on micro- and macro-market statistics. Are there cross-mechanism
dierences between optimal parameter combinations, or, more fun-
damentally, is there a steady-state optimal parameter combination
at all? How do the time series of parameters—which, in a real -
nancial market, would be unobservable—aect macro-observable
quantities such as leptokurticity of returns or volatility? To an-
swer these questions, we rst characterize basic macro properties
of the simulations under each selection mechanism. Aside from
the price X (t) and return r (t) = log10 X (t) − log10 X (t − 1) time
series, we calculate the price power spectral density, dened by
Sxx (ω) = Xˆ (ω)Xˆ †(ω), where we have dened the Fourier transform
on the interval [0,T ] by
Xˆ (ω) = 1√
T
T∑
t=1
X (t)e−iωt∆t , (7)
where ∆t = 124 , so that the units of the Fourier transform are
1/days. For nancial price time series we expect Sxx (ω) ∼ ω−γ ,
where γ ∈ (1.7, 2). Brownian motion has γ = 2, while real asset
Figure 5: Mean prot levels diered by selection mech-
anism. e quantile (truncation) selection mechanism
lead to average prots that were approximately an order
of magnitude higher than that of the second-most prof-
itable mechanism, the mixture of tness-proportionate se-
lection and quantile selection. While returning positive av-
erage prots, tness-proportionate selection was the least
protable of the non-control selection mechanisms. In
this context, average prot is dened by 〈pi (t)〉j,sim =
1
NsimNagents
∑Nsim
n=1
∑
j active at time t pij,n (t)
markets exhibit γ ∼ 1.8 in price dynamics [6, 23]. Time series
of the parameters pbid, j , Nshares, j , and νj are described and their
distributions are t and compared with distributions predicted from
the theoretical models described above. Finally, we analyze the link
between the agent-level micro-volatility parameters νj and macro-
volatility as measured from price or return time series and remark
on its dierentiation by selection mechanism.
3 RESULTS
We ran 1000 runs of the articial asset market simulation for each
selection mechanism (control,Mquantile,Mfps, andMmixed) for
a total of 4000 simulations. Each simulation was composed of
24 “hour” trading periods in each trading “day”. A total of 252
trading days per year (in analogy with the calendar of the U.S.
national market system) resulted in a total of 6048 trading periods
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per simulation. e number of agents in each simulation was held
constant at 100. To determine that the number of runs of the
simulation was adequate for the calculation of population averages,
we generated reruns of the simulation until temporal averages of
the population price time series power spectral density exponents
appeared to converge. is convergence is displayed in Figure 4.
3.1 Protability and parameter evolution
e mean protability of agents under each selection mechanism
is displayed in Figure 5. Here, we dene an average over both runs
of the simulation and active agents, viz.
〈pi (t)〉j, sim = 1
NagentsNsim
Nsim∑
n=1
∑
j active at time t
pij,n (t). (8)
e purely quantile-based mechanism displays average protability
that is over an order of magnitude greater than eitherMmixed or
Mfps, while Mmixed was still much more protable on average
than was Mfps. is dierentiation is likely to due to the fact
that Mquantile selects out the ten worst-performing individuals
each time it is active, whileMfps selects out on average |S(t)| −∑
j ∈S(t ) pj = 9 individuals that are randomly sampled from the
population; while the individuals selected out are, on average, the
worst performing individuals in that particular S(t), they are by no
means the worst-performing individuals in the entire population.
ough this implementation ofMfps results in signicantly less
selective pressure on the population than doesMquantile, this choice
is made to hold constant the number of individual agents involved
in the selection step of the market simulation.
Agents’ parameters—the probability of submiing a bid, pbid, j , the
mean number of shares submied in an order Nshares, j , and the
volatility preference νj—were inuenced by the choice of selection
mechanism. Overall,Mquantile was associated with lower standard
deviations of parameter time series as calculated over runs of the
simulation. Figure 2 displays parameter time series for all runs
of the simulation in the le panel, and averages over runs of the
simulation in the right panel. BothMquantile andMmixed showed
time decay toward lower values in Nshares and ν when averaged
over both active agents and runs of the simulation. On the contrary,
Mfps showed no decay in either parameter when the same aver-
age was performed. When decoupled from time, distributions of
the parameters showed remarkable similarity across mechanisms,
showing evidence for a unied underlying evolutionary model as
proposed in Eqs. 4 - 6, the parameters of which depend on the selec-
tion mechanism. ese time-decoupled distributions are displayed
in Figure 3.
3.2 Volatility correlation
Since it seems reasonable that a tness-proportionate selection
mechanism most closely approximates the selection mechanism
operating in today’s nancial asset markets, we are particularly in-
terested in correlations between micro-volatility—agents’ volatility
preferences νj—and macro measures of volatility. We are interested
in the eects of mechanism on these macro measures of volatility,
and particularly wish to test if micro-volatility is correlated with
macro-volatility in the cases ofMfps andMmixed, as this could
Figure 6: Micro-macro volatility correlation varies by
selection mechanism. We chose an arbitrary rerun
and show the average volatility preference, 〈ν (t)〉j =
1
Nagents
∑
j active at time t νj (t), displayed as a solid curve, plot-
ted against macro-volatility calculated as the solution of a
GARCH(1, 1) process, displayed as a dashed curve. Aer cal-
culation, these processeswere normalized to have zeromean
and unit variance for display on the same scale. From top to
bottom:Mquantile,Mmixed, andMfps.
provide some insight into how volatility is generated in real -
nancial markets. Macro-volatility—volatility as measured from
market-wide statistics such as price and returns—is oen modeled
using a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(GARCH) model [3], which, in its most basic form, hypothesizes
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Figure 7: Micro and macro volatility measures are highly
correlated when tness-proportionate selection is included
in the selection mechanism (i.e., the mechanism is either
mixed or tness-proportionate). ere is correlation be-
tween micro and macro volatility under the pure quantile
mechanism, but the eects of agents’ volatility preferences
are muted in comparison. Calculated values were used in
a kernel density estimate, plotted above, computed using
Gaussian kernels and the Silverman rule for bandwidth es-
timation.
that log returns r (t) = log10 X (t)−log10 X (t−1) can be decomposed
as
r (t) = µ + ε(t) (9)
ε(t) = σ (t)z(t) (10)
σ 2(t) = ξ + αε2(t − 1) + βσ 2(t − 1), (11)
where z(t) ∼ N(0, 1). For each simulation, we compute a GARCH
model of the form given above and calculate the Spearman correla-
tion coecient ρ(〈ν〉,σ ) between the average agent volatility prefer-
ence 〈ν (t)〉j = 1Nagents
∑
j active at time t νj (t) and the ed volatility
σ (t). Figure 6 displays 〈ν (t)〉j and σ (t) for an arbitrarily chosen run
of the simulation. Figure 7 displays the empirical probability den-
sity function (pdf) of ρ(〈ν〉j ,σ ) across all non-control simulations.
(e pdf of correlations for the control is sharply peaked about zero
and uninteresting as there is no evolution of νj in this case.) e
pdf of correlation coecients forMquantile is bimodal, with one
mode about zero and another near ρ = 0.5, while forMmixed and
Mfps the pdfs are are peaked near ρ ' 0.75 with a long le tail.
3.3 eoretical t
Since the theoretical models for the evolution of agents’ parameters
given by Eqs. 4 - 6 contain nine free parameters in total, to assess
their suitability as a rst-order theoretical model of the evolution-
ary phenomena occurring here we must t these parameters from
the data generated by the agent-based model. To do this we hypoth-
esize a parametric form ptheo(x |β) for each distribution: p(pbid),
p(Nshares), and p(ν ). e optimal values of β are dened as the
Figure 8: Parameters to theoretical models of pbid, Nshares,
and ν were t using maximum likelihood estimation and
dierential evolution, as described in the text. Displayed
here are the t distributions of the theoretical models for
the mixed mechanism in dashed blue curves, random vari-
ates drawn from the theoretical model in solid blue curves,
and t distributions of the ABM in magenta curves., Calcu-
lated optimal values of free parameters for each model are
displayed in the title of each panel.
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vector that minimizes∫
x ∈Ω
pabm(x) log
(
pabm(x)
ptheo(x |β)
)
dx , (12)
the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of the theoretical distribution
away from the distribution produced by the ABM. e domain of
integration Ω is dened as all observed values of the quantity x
for each time step and each run of the simulation. is integral
is minimized using dierential evolution [30], at each iteration of
which a number of simulations of the theoretical model Eqs. 4 -
6 are calculated and the maximum likelihood estimation of the
parameter vector β is found, which is then substituted into the
functional form of ptheo used in the denition of KL divergence.
Figure 8 displays comparisons between the ed theoretical dis-
tributions and distributions arising from the ABM forMmixed. To
emphasize that the restriction of the t distribution to a parameter-
ized form does not result in a model that ts the data poorly, random
variates drawn from each model are drawn and their histogram
is ploed along with the t distributions. e calculated optimal
values of the free parameters for each model are displayed in the
title of each panel. ere is strong restorative force (θpbid = 5.306)
to the equilibrium bid probability pbid = 12 , while there is negative
evolutionary dri in mean number of shares submied per order
(µNshares = −0.015) and volatility preference (µν = −0.001).
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We nd that choice of selection mechanism is associated with dier-
ential behavior of asset price spectra, agent parameter distributions
and time series, and volatility. While the probability of submiing a
bid order uctuates regularly about its natural equilibrium value of
p∗bid =
1
2 under all three mechanisms, the time series of the average
number of shares traded and the volatility preference parameter
varies functionally depending on the presence of a quantile-based
component to the selection mechanism. When a quantile-based
component is not present (Mfps), these time series vary in the mean
case very lile from their initial values, with a slight upward trend.
However, when a quantile-based component is present, in the mean
case these series exhibit a steady trend toward lower values. In both
Nshares and ν ,Mmixed trends most strongly toward lower values
and does not appear to converge in the time period covered by
our simulation (252 days of trading once per hour), suggesting that
longer simulation run times are necessary to discern the nature of
the steady state of these parameters under mechanisms containing
a quantile-based component, if such steady-states exist.
All three mechanisms show signicant correlation between micro-
volatility, as measured by the risk-aversion / volatility preference
parameter ν , and market-wide volatility measured from the mar-
ket price using standard econometric models (GARCH). All distri-
butions of Pearson correlation coecients of micro- and macro-
volatility exhibited negative skew (more weight in the le-hand
tail). e quantile-based mechanism displayed bimodality in this
distribution, with a small peak near zero correlation and a large
peak near ρ = 0.5. Contrasting with this,Mmixed andMfps were
unimodal, with peaks near ρ ' 0.75, displaying a strong median
correlation between micro- and macro-volatility.
Taken together, these results paint a picture of nontrivial interac-
tion between selection mechanism and market outcomes. Mecha-
nisms that include a tness-proportionate component show higher
volatility than a purely quantile-based mechanism, and under those
mechanisms micro-volatility is more highly correlated with observ-
able macro-volatility, providing a possible mechanistic explanation
for the generation of macro-volatility in real nancial markets.
However, mechanisms that contain a quantile-based component
show signicant evolutionary dri in the average number of shares
submied per order and in volatility preference. When taken along
with the fact that these mechanisms produced far higher average
prots than did the purely tness-proportionate method, this sug-
gests that lower values of these parameters are—in a population of
zero-intelligence agents, at least—associated with higher average
prot levels, possibly due to an increase in risk-aversion among the
population of agents and a corresponding decrease in the frequency
of agents that experience massive trading losses.
Our study has several areas on which future work could improve,
the most important of which being our neglection of other selection
mechanisms. ere are far more—and more realistic!—mechanisms
that provide a model for how agents may be removed from, and
added to, a nancial market. Drawing denitive conclusions about
the nature of market selection and competition from a study of only
two fundamental mechanisms is ill-advised, and we decline to do
this. Another shortcoming is our lack of variation of many parame-
ters in this study. In order to understand these mechanisms in more
depth, a detailed study of macro-observable market statistics as a
function of, e.g., tournament size, quantile, and mixture probabil-
ity between the two fundamental mechanisms is required. Future
work should focus on inclusion of more and dierent selection
mechanisms, as well as inclusion of more advanced agents.
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